diff --git a/SPECS/util-linux/CVE-2026-53612.patch b/SPECS/util-linux/CVE-2026-53612.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f62b49f96a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/SPECS/util-linux/CVE-2026-53612.patch @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +From 897a08c2b11dfa66975c3d24d63c7bf5f5be1a7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Karel Zak +Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 11:15:19 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 2/2] libmount: use fd-based fchownat/chmod in hook_owner + +Replace path-based lchown()/chmod() with fd-based operations in the +X-mount.{owner,group,mode} post-mount hook. + +For restricted users the fd_target is pinned in prepare_target() and +re-opened after mount in hook_attach_target() to point to the mounted +filesystem root. For root a local O_PATH fd is opened. Ownership is +changed via fchownat(fd, "", ..., AT_EMPTY_PATH), mode via +/proc/self/fd/N. + +This prevents TOCTOU attacks where an ancestor directory is swapped +between mount and the chmod/chown operations. + +CVE-2026-53612 + +Reported-by: Xinyao Hu +Signed-off-by: Karel Zak +(cherry picked from commit 24da33905c7115c4cbccd0afb2a469804e96467a) +Signed-off-by: Azure Linux Security Servicing Account +Upstream-reference: https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/commit/897a08c2b11dfa66975c3d24d63c7bf5f5be1a7c.patch +--- + libmount/src/hook_owner.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- + 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/libmount/src/hook_owner.c b/libmount/src/hook_owner.c +index 11b238c..99f0e70 100644 +--- a/libmount/src/hook_owner.c ++++ b/libmount/src/hook_owner.c +@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ + #include + + #include "mountP.h" ++#include "pathnames.h" + #include "fileutils.h" + + struct hook_data { +@@ -48,7 +49,7 @@ static int hook_post( + { + struct hook_data *hd = (struct hook_data *) data; + const char *target; +- int rc = 0; ++ int rc = 0, fd; + + assert(cxt); + +@@ -59,18 +60,33 @@ static int hook_post( + if (!target) + return 0; + ++ /* fd_target is pinned in restricted mode (see prepare_target()), ++ * for root open it here to keep chmod/chown fd-based too */ ++ if (mnt_context_target_fd_required(cxt)) ++ fd = mnt_context_get_target_fd(cxt); ++ else ++ fd = open(target, O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC); ++ ++ if (fd < 0) ++ return -MNT_ERR_CHMOD; ++ + if (hd->owner != (uid_t) -1 || hd->group != (uid_t) -1) { +- DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, " lchown(%s, %u, %u)", target, hd->owner, hd->group)); +- if (lchown(target, hd->owner, hd->group) == -1) +- return -MNT_ERR_CHOWN; ++ DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, " fchownat(%s, %u, %u)", target, hd->owner, hd->group)); ++ if (fchownat(fd, "", hd->owner, hd->group, AT_EMPTY_PATH) == -1) ++ rc = -MNT_ERR_CHOWN; + } + +- if (hd->mode != (mode_t) -1) { +- DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, " chmod(%s, %04o)", target, hd->mode)); +- if (chmod(target, hd->mode) == -1) +- return -MNT_ERR_CHMOD; ++ if (!rc && hd->mode != (mode_t) -1) { ++ char buf[sizeof(_PATH_PROC_FDDIR) + 1 + sizeof(stringify_value(INT_MAX))]; ++ ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), _PATH_PROC_FDDIR "/%d", fd); ++ DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, " chmod(%s, %04o)", buf, hd->mode)); ++ if (chmod(buf, hd->mode) == -1) ++ rc = -MNT_ERR_CHMOD; + } + ++ if (!mnt_context_target_fd_required(cxt)) ++ close(fd); + return rc; + } + +-- +2.45.4 + diff --git a/SPECS/util-linux/CVE-2026-53613.patch b/SPECS/util-linux/CVE-2026-53613.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..a9939425de9 --- /dev/null +++ b/SPECS/util-linux/CVE-2026-53613.patch @@ -0,0 +1,183 @@ +From 0b010025a0e429bc80355c94db86a843395d49e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Karel Zak +Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 11:13:54 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] libmount: add fd_target to context for TOCTOU prevention + +Add a pinned O_PATH target fd to libmnt_context with lazy-open getter +mnt_context_get_target_fd() and mnt_context_close_target_fd(). + +The fd is opened via ul_open_no_symlinks() (RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS) to +reject symlinks at any path component. The fd is closed on context +reset. + +Backport note: CVE-2026-78410.patch already adds fileutils.h to context.c. +Omit only that duplicate include hunk; retain the upstream target-FD changes. + +CVE-2026-53613 + +Signed-off-by: Karel Zak +(cherry picked from commit 78a860982e036f38fe9c0b3344998df5ac2c2ff5) +Signed-off-by: Azure Linux Security Servicing Account +Upstream-reference: https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/commit/0b010025a0e429bc80355c94db86a843395d49e2.patch +--- + libmount/src/context.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + libmount/src/context_mount.c | 7 ++++++ + libmount/src/hook_mount.c | 18 ++++++++++++- + libmount/src/hook_mount_legacy.c | 3 +++ + libmount/src/mountP.h | 7 ++++++ + 5 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/libmount/src/context.c b/libmount/src/context.c +--- a/libmount/src/context.c ++++ b/libmount/src/context.c +@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ struct libmnt_context *mnt_new_context(void) + cxt->ns_orig.fd = -1; + cxt->ns_tgt.fd = -1; + cxt->ns_cur = &cxt->ns_orig; ++ cxt->fd_target = -1; + + cxt->map_linux = mnt_get_builtin_optmap(MNT_LINUX_MAP); + cxt->map_userspace = mnt_get_builtin_optmap(MNT_USERSPACE_MAP); +@@ -175,6 +176,7 @@ int mnt_reset_context(struct libmnt_context *cxt) + cxt->map_userspace = mnt_get_builtin_optmap(MNT_USERSPACE_MAP); + + mnt_context_reset_status(cxt); ++ mnt_context_close_target_fd(cxt); + mnt_context_deinit_hooksets(cxt); + + if (cxt->table_fltrcb) +@@ -400,6 +402,46 @@ int mnt_context_is_restricted(struct libmnt_context *cxt) + return cxt->restricted; + } + ++int mnt_context_target_fd_required(struct libmnt_context *cxt) ++{ ++ return mnt_context_is_restricted(cxt); ++} ++ ++int mnt_context_reopen_target_fd(struct libmnt_context *cxt) ++{ ++ assert(cxt); ++ ++ if (!mnt_context_target_fd_required(cxt)) ++ return 0; ++ mnt_context_close_target_fd(cxt); ++ if (mnt_context_get_target_fd(cxt) < 0) ++ return -errno; ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int mnt_context_get_target_fd(struct libmnt_context *cxt) ++{ ++ assert(cxt); ++ ++ if (cxt->fd_target < 0) { ++ const char *target = mnt_fs_get_target(cxt->fs); ++ ++ if (target) ++ cxt->fd_target = ul_open_no_symlinks(target, ++ O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC, 0); ++ } ++ return cxt->fd_target; ++} ++ ++void mnt_context_close_target_fd(struct libmnt_context *cxt) ++{ ++ assert(cxt); ++ ++ if (cxt->fd_target >= 0) ++ close(cxt->fd_target); ++ cxt->fd_target = -1; ++} ++ + /** + * mnt_context_force_unrestricted: + * @cxt: mount context +diff --git a/libmount/src/context_mount.c b/libmount/src/context_mount.c +index 28e01309d8c..77435684b4a 100644 +--- a/libmount/src/context_mount.c ++++ b/libmount/src/context_mount.c +@@ -740,6 +740,13 @@ static int prepare_target(struct libmnt_context *cxt) + if (rc == 0) + rc = mnt_context_call_hooks(cxt, MNT_STAGE_PREP_TARGET); + ++ if (rc == 0 ++ && mnt_context_target_fd_required(cxt) ++ && mnt_context_get_target_fd(cxt) < 0) { ++ DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "failed to pin target")); ++ rc = -errno; ++ } ++ + if (!mnt_context_switch_ns(cxt, ns_old)) + return -MNT_ERR_NAMESPACE; + +diff --git a/libmount/src/hook_mount.c b/libmount/src/hook_mount.c +index 37179fb59ad..50e656e04af 100644 +--- a/libmount/src/hook_mount.c ++++ b/libmount/src/hook_mount.c +@@ -516,9 +516,25 @@ static int hook_attach_target(struct libmnt_context *cxt, + umount2(target, MNT_DETACH); + } + +- rc = move_mount(api->fd_tree, "", AT_FDCWD, target, MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH); ++ /* fd_target is open in restricted mode (see prepare_target()) */ ++ if (mnt_context_target_fd_required(cxt)) { ++ int fd = mnt_context_get_target_fd(cxt); ++ ++ if (fd < 0) ++ return -errno; ++ rc = move_mount(api->fd_tree, "", fd, "", ++ MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH | MOVE_MOUNT_T_EMPTY_PATH); ++ } else ++ rc = move_mount(api->fd_tree, "", AT_FDCWD, target, ++ MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH); ++ + hookset_set_syscall_status(cxt, "move_mount", rc == 0); + ++ if (rc == 0) { ++ /* re-open to point to the mounted filesystem root */ ++ rc = mnt_context_reopen_target_fd(cxt); ++ } ++ + return rc == 0 ? 0 : -errno; + } + +diff --git a/libmount/src/hook_mount_legacy.c b/libmount/src/hook_mount_legacy.c +index 94a8fc685eb..d6631b08864 100644 +--- a/libmount/src/hook_mount_legacy.c ++++ b/libmount/src/hook_mount_legacy.c +@@ -243,6 +243,9 @@ static int hook_mount(struct libmnt_context *cxt, + return rc; + } + ++ /* re-open to point to the mounted filesystem root */ ++ rc = mnt_context_reopen_target_fd(cxt); ++ + cxt->syscall_status = 0; + return rc; + } +diff --git a/libmount/src/mountP.h b/libmount/src/mountP.h +index a4ce7c04268..97d0bf8fa79 100644 +--- a/libmount/src/mountP.h ++++ b/libmount/src/mountP.h +@@ -497,6 +497,8 @@ struct libmnt_context + unsigned int has_selinux_opt : 1; /* temporary for broken fsconfig() syscall */ + unsigned int force_clone : 1; /* OPEN_TREE_CLONE */ + ++ int fd_target; /* pinned target fd (RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS) */ ++ + struct list_head hooksets_datas; /* global hooksets data */ + struct list_head hooksets_hooks; /* global hooksets data */ + }; +@@ -678,6 +680,11 @@ extern int mnt_context_prepare_update(struct libmnt_context *cxt); + extern int mnt_context_merge_mflags(struct libmnt_context *cxt); + extern int mnt_context_update_tabs(struct libmnt_context *cxt); + ++extern int mnt_context_target_fd_required(struct libmnt_context *cxt); ++extern int mnt_context_get_target_fd(struct libmnt_context *cxt); ++extern void mnt_context_close_target_fd(struct libmnt_context *cxt); ++extern int mnt_context_reopen_target_fd(struct libmnt_context *cxt); ++ + extern int mnt_context_umount_setopt(struct libmnt_context *cxt, int c, char *arg); + extern int mnt_context_mount_setopt(struct libmnt_context *cxt, int c, char *arg); + diff --git a/SPECS/util-linux/CVE-2026-53614.patch b/SPECS/util-linux/CVE-2026-53614.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f36c6f8794b --- /dev/null +++ b/SPECS/util-linux/CVE-2026-53614.patch @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +From cc81bbcec598cb91f0eb8456282f33eed820ed5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Karel Zak +Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 10:58:32 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] libmount: fix SUID bypass via LIBMOUNT_FORCE_MOUNT2 and + legacy mount path + +Use safe_getenv() for LIBMOUNT_FORCE_MOUNT2 to ignore the variable +in SUID context, consistent with LIBMOUNT_FSTAB and other sensitive +environment variables. + +Additionally, refuse multi-step mount(2) sequences (bind+remount and +propagation) for restricted (non-root) users in the legacy mount path. +The two-step approach has a window between syscalls where security +flags (nosuid, noexec, ...) are not yet applied. The new mount API +handles this atomically. + +CVE-2026-53614 + +Reported-by: Xinyao Hu +Signed-off-by: Karel Zak +(cherry picked from commit 9cbfb823500f510b34767edabd3ffd5b436987b4) +Signed-off-by: Azure Linux Security Servicing Account +Upstream-reference: https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/commit/cc81bbcec598cb91f0eb8456282f33eed820ed5f.patch +--- + libmount/src/hook_mount.c | 3 ++- + libmount/src/hook_mount_legacy.c | 8 ++++++++ + 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/libmount/src/hook_mount.c b/libmount/src/hook_mount.c +index 116046b..098b1ac 100644 +--- a/libmount/src/hook_mount.c ++++ b/libmount/src/hook_mount.c +@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ + */ + + #include "mountP.h" ++#include "env.h" + #include "fileutils.h" /* statx() fallback */ + #include "strutils.h" + #include "mount-api-utils.h" +@@ -658,7 +659,7 @@ fail: + + static int force_classic_mount(struct libmnt_context *cxt) + { +- const char *env = getenv("LIBMOUNT_FORCE_MOUNT2"); ++ const char *env = safe_getenv("LIBMOUNT_FORCE_MOUNT2"); + + if (env) { + if (strcmp(env, "always") == 0) +diff --git a/libmount/src/hook_mount_legacy.c b/libmount/src/hook_mount_legacy.c +index ab8c2c2..b7882a1 100644 +--- a/libmount/src/hook_mount_legacy.c ++++ b/libmount/src/hook_mount_legacy.c +@@ -285,6 +285,8 @@ static int hook_prepare(struct libmnt_context *cxt, + + /* add extra mount(2) calls for each propagation flag */ + if (flags & MS_PROPAGATION) { ++ if (mnt_context_is_restricted(cxt)) ++ goto eperm; + rc = prepare_propagation(cxt, hs); + if (rc) + return rc; +@@ -294,12 +296,18 @@ static int hook_prepare(struct libmnt_context *cxt, + if ((flags & MS_BIND) + && (flags & MNT_BIND_SETTABLE) + && !(flags & MS_REMOUNT)) { ++ if (mnt_context_is_restricted(cxt)) ++ goto eperm; + rc = prepare_bindremount(cxt, hs); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + + return rc; ++eperm: ++ DBG(HOOK, ul_debugobj(hs, ++ "multi-step mount(2) refused for non-root user")); ++ return -EPERM; + } + + const struct libmnt_hookset hookset_mount_legacy = +-- +2.45.4 + diff --git a/SPECS/util-linux/CVE-2026-53615.patch b/SPECS/util-linux/CVE-2026-53615.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..28b4ed60492 --- /dev/null +++ b/SPECS/util-linux/CVE-2026-53615.patch @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +From b9e3490fe7d495fc85d75a4542d73f056a6efb8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Karel Zak +Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2026 11:54:28 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] libblkid: dos: validate EBR data and links within extended + partition + +The parse_dos_extended() function processes EBR (Extended Boot Record) +chains, but does not properly validate that partitions and links stay +within the master extended partition area [ex_start, ex_start+ex_size). + +For EBR data partitions at index 0 and 1, there are no bounds checks +at all, unlike entries at index 2 and 3. This allows a crafted disk +image to register partitions at arbitrary sectors via uint32_t overflow +in the abs_start calculation (cur_start + start wraps to a small value). + +Fix by: + - using 64-bit arithmetic for the abs_start calculation to avoid + uint32_t wraparound + - applying the extended partition area bounds check to all EBR data + entries, not just index >= 2 + - validating EBR link targets stay within the extended area and + advance forward (preventing backward links that could loop) + +Reported-by: Michele Piccinni +Signed-off-by: Karel Zak +(cherry picked from commit e9d544d013267ea86b70ee8ff78abd280e6641af) +Signed-off-by: Azure Linux Security Servicing Account +Upstream-reference: https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/commit/05c2dbadf34cc74192287f377904afaaf4061623.patch +--- + libblkid/src/partitions/dos.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- + 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/libblkid/src/partitions/dos.c b/libblkid/src/partitions/dos.c +index d5a8aa3..5c78aac 100644 +--- a/libblkid/src/partitions/dos.c ++++ b/libblkid/src/partitions/dos.c +@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ static int parse_dos_extended(blkid_probe pr, blkid_parttable tab, + { + blkid_partlist ls = blkid_probe_get_partlist(pr); + uint32_t cur_start = ex_start, cur_size = ex_size; ++ uint64_t ex_end = (uint64_t) ex_start + ex_size; + const unsigned char *data; + int ct_nodata = 0; /* count ext.partitions without data partitions */ + int i; +@@ -88,24 +89,31 @@ static int parse_dos_extended(blkid_probe pr, blkid_parttable tab, + /* Parse data partition */ + for (p = p0, i = 0; i < 4; i++, p++) { + uint32_t abs_start; ++ uint64_t abs; + blkid_partition par; + + /* the start is relative to the parental ext.partition */ + start = dos_partition_get_start(p) * ssf; + size = dos_partition_get_size(p) * ssf; +- abs_start = cur_start + start; /* absolute start */ + + if (!size || is_extended(p)) + continue; ++ ++ abs = (uint64_t) cur_start + start; ++ ++ /* data partition must be within the extended area */ ++ if (abs < ex_start || abs + size > ex_end) { ++ DBG(LOWPROBE, ul_debug("#%d: EBR data partition outside " ++ "extended -- ignore", i + 1)); ++ continue; ++ } ++ abs_start = (uint32_t) abs; ++ + if (i >= 2) { +- /* extra checks to detect real data on ++ /* extra check to detect real data on + * 3rd and 4th entries */ + if (start + size > cur_size) + continue; +- if (abs_start < ex_start) +- continue; +- if (abs_start + size > ex_start + ex_size) +- continue; + } + + /* Avoid recursive non-empty links, see ct_nodata counter */ +@@ -142,8 +150,22 @@ static int parse_dos_extended(blkid_probe pr, blkid_parttable tab, + if (i == 4) + goto leave; + +- cur_start = ex_start + start; +- cur_size = size; ++ { ++ uint64_t next = (uint64_t) ex_start + start; ++ ++ if (next + size > ex_end) { ++ DBG(LOWPROBE, ul_debug("EBR link outside " ++ "extended area -- leave")); ++ goto leave; ++ } ++ if (next <= cur_start) { ++ DBG(LOWPROBE, ul_debug("EBR link does not " ++ "advance -- leave")); ++ goto leave; ++ } ++ cur_start = (uint32_t) next; ++ cur_size = size; ++ } + } + leave: + return BLKID_PROBE_OK; +-- +2.45.4 + diff --git a/SPECS/util-linux/util-linux.spec b/SPECS/util-linux/util-linux.spec index 6b461df59b4..af6eaed0bc0 100644 --- a/SPECS/util-linux/util-linux.spec +++ b/SPECS/util-linux/util-linux.spec @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ Summary: Utilities for file systems, consoles, partitions, and messages Name: util-linux Version: 2.40.2 -Release: 6%{?dist} +Release: 7%{?dist} License: GPLv2+ Vendor: Microsoft Corporation Distribution: Azure Linux @@ -23,6 +23,10 @@ Patch3: CVE-2026-13595.patch Patch4: CVE-2026-76642.patch Patch5: CVE-2026-78408.patch Patch6: CVE-2026-78410.patch +Patch7: CVE-2026-53612.patch +Patch8: CVE-2026-53613.patch +Patch9: CVE-2026-53614.patch +Patch10: CVE-2026-53615.patch BuildRequires: audit-devel BuildRequires: libcap-ng-devel BuildRequires: libselinux-devel @@ -178,6 +182,9 @@ rm -rf %{buildroot}/lib/systemd/system %{_mandir}/man3/* %changelog +* Fri Oct 16 2026 Azure Linux Security Servicing Account - 2.40.2-7 +- Patch for CVE-2026-53615, CVE-2026-53612, CVE-2026-53613, CVE-2026-53614 + * Mon Sep 07 2026 Azure Linux Security Servicing Account - 2.40.2-6 - Patch for CVE-2026-78410, CVE-2026-78408, CVE-2026-76642 diff --git a/toolkit/resources/manifests/package/pkggen_core_aarch64.txt b/toolkit/resources/manifests/package/pkggen_core_aarch64.txt index ef4d10a979c..5010c39c396 100644 --- a/toolkit/resources/manifests/package/pkggen_core_aarch64.txt +++ b/toolkit/resources/manifests/package/pkggen_core_aarch64.txt @@ -70,9 +70,9 @@ make-4.4.1-2.azl3.aarch64.rpm patch-2.7.6-10.azl3.aarch64.rpm libcap-ng-0.8.4-1.azl3.aarch64.rpm libcap-ng-devel-0.8.4-1.azl3.aarch64.rpm -util-linux-2.40.2-6.azl3.aarch64.rpm -util-linux-devel-2.40.2-6.azl3.aarch64.rpm -util-linux-libs-2.40.2-6.azl3.aarch64.rpm +util-linux-2.40.2-7.azl3.aarch64.rpm +util-linux-devel-2.40.2-7.azl3.aarch64.rpm +util-linux-libs-2.40.2-7.azl3.aarch64.rpm tar-1.35-2.azl3.aarch64.rpm xz-5.4.4-3.azl3.aarch64.rpm xz-devel-5.4.4-3.azl3.aarch64.rpm diff --git a/toolkit/resources/manifests/package/pkggen_core_x86_64.txt b/toolkit/resources/manifests/package/pkggen_core_x86_64.txt index 49d75af033b..3a3b84bcfa1 100644 --- a/toolkit/resources/manifests/package/pkggen_core_x86_64.txt +++ b/toolkit/resources/manifests/package/pkggen_core_x86_64.txt @@ -70,9 +70,9 @@ make-4.4.1-2.azl3.x86_64.rpm patch-2.7.6-10.azl3.x86_64.rpm libcap-ng-0.8.4-1.azl3.x86_64.rpm libcap-ng-devel-0.8.4-1.azl3.x86_64.rpm -util-linux-2.40.2-6.azl3.x86_64.rpm -util-linux-devel-2.40.2-6.azl3.x86_64.rpm -util-linux-libs-2.40.2-6.azl3.x86_64.rpm +util-linux-2.40.2-7.azl3.x86_64.rpm +util-linux-devel-2.40.2-7.azl3.x86_64.rpm +util-linux-libs-2.40.2-7.azl3.x86_64.rpm tar-1.35-2.azl3.x86_64.rpm xz-5.4.4-3.azl3.x86_64.rpm xz-devel-5.4.4-3.azl3.x86_64.rpm diff --git a/toolkit/resources/manifests/package/toolchain_aarch64.txt b/toolkit/resources/manifests/package/toolchain_aarch64.txt index 3df14d35e96..6d5c4218046 100644 --- a/toolkit/resources/manifests/package/toolchain_aarch64.txt +++ b/toolkit/resources/manifests/package/toolchain_aarch64.txt @@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ python3-flit-core-3.9.0-1.azl3.noarch.rpm python3-gpg-1.23.2-2.azl3.aarch64.rpm python3-jinja2-3.1.2-3.azl3.noarch.rpm python3-libcap-ng-0.8.4-1.azl3.aarch64.rpm -python3-libmount-2.40.2-6.azl3.aarch64.rpm +python3-libmount-2.40.2-7.azl3.aarch64.rpm python3-libs-3.12.15-1.azl3.aarch64.rpm python3-libxml2-2.11.5-11.azl3.aarch64.rpm python3-lxml-4.9.3-3.azl3.aarch64.rpm @@ -599,11 +599,11 @@ texinfo-7.0.3-1.azl3.aarch64.rpm texinfo-debuginfo-7.0.3-1.azl3.aarch64.rpm unzip-6.0-22.azl3.aarch64.rpm unzip-debuginfo-6.0-22.azl3.aarch64.rpm -util-linux-2.40.2-6.azl3.aarch64.rpm -util-linux-debuginfo-2.40.2-6.azl3.aarch64.rpm -util-linux-devel-2.40.2-6.azl3.aarch64.rpm -util-linux-lang-2.40.2-6.azl3.aarch64.rpm -util-linux-libs-2.40.2-6.azl3.aarch64.rpm +util-linux-2.40.2-7.azl3.aarch64.rpm +util-linux-debuginfo-2.40.2-7.azl3.aarch64.rpm +util-linux-devel-2.40.2-7.azl3.aarch64.rpm +util-linux-lang-2.40.2-7.azl3.aarch64.rpm +util-linux-libs-2.40.2-7.azl3.aarch64.rpm which-2.21-8.azl3.aarch64.rpm which-debuginfo-2.21-8.azl3.aarch64.rpm xz-5.4.4-3.azl3.aarch64.rpm diff --git a/toolkit/resources/manifests/package/toolchain_x86_64.txt b/toolkit/resources/manifests/package/toolchain_x86_64.txt index 1d179e6ede8..d7c21ba66d9 100644 --- a/toolkit/resources/manifests/package/toolchain_x86_64.txt +++ b/toolkit/resources/manifests/package/toolchain_x86_64.txt @@ -550,7 +550,7 @@ python3-flit-core-3.9.0-1.azl3.noarch.rpm python3-gpg-1.23.2-2.azl3.x86_64.rpm python3-jinja2-3.1.2-3.azl3.noarch.rpm python3-libcap-ng-0.8.4-1.azl3.x86_64.rpm -python3-libmount-2.40.2-6.azl3.x86_64.rpm +python3-libmount-2.40.2-7.azl3.x86_64.rpm python3-libs-3.12.15-1.azl3.x86_64.rpm python3-libxml2-2.11.5-11.azl3.x86_64.rpm python3-lxml-4.9.3-3.azl3.x86_64.rpm @@ -607,11 +607,11 @@ texinfo-7.0.3-1.azl3.x86_64.rpm texinfo-debuginfo-7.0.3-1.azl3.x86_64.rpm unzip-6.0-22.azl3.x86_64.rpm unzip-debuginfo-6.0-22.azl3.x86_64.rpm -util-linux-2.40.2-6.azl3.x86_64.rpm -util-linux-debuginfo-2.40.2-6.azl3.x86_64.rpm -util-linux-devel-2.40.2-6.azl3.x86_64.rpm -util-linux-lang-2.40.2-6.azl3.x86_64.rpm -util-linux-libs-2.40.2-6.azl3.x86_64.rpm +util-linux-2.40.2-7.azl3.x86_64.rpm +util-linux-debuginfo-2.40.2-7.azl3.x86_64.rpm +util-linux-devel-2.40.2-7.azl3.x86_64.rpm +util-linux-lang-2.40.2-7.azl3.x86_64.rpm +util-linux-libs-2.40.2-7.azl3.x86_64.rpm which-2.21-8.azl3.x86_64.rpm which-debuginfo-2.21-8.azl3.x86_64.rpm xz-5.4.4-3.azl3.x86_64.rpm